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Prefix hijacking, a misbehavior in which a misconfigured or malicious BGP router originates an
IP prefix that the router does not own, is becoming an increasingly serious security problem on
the Internet. In this paper, we conduct a first comprehensive study on incrementally deployable
mitigation solutions against prefix hijacking. We first propose a novel reactive detection-assisted
solution based on the idea of bogus route purging and valid route promotion. Our simulations
based on realistic settings show that purging bogus routes at 20 highest-degree ASes reduces the
polluted portion of the Internet by a random prefix hijack from 50% down to 24%, and adding
promotion further reduces the remaining pollution by 33% ∼ 57%, We prove that our proposed
route purging and promotion scheme preserve the convergence properties of BGP regardless of
the number of promoters. We are the first to demonstrate that detection systems based on a
limited number of BGP feeds are subject to detection evasion by hijackers. Motivated the need
for proactive defenses to complement reactive mitigation response, we evaluate customer route
filtering, a best common practice among large ISPs today, and show its limited effectiveness. We
also show the added benefits of combining route purging-promotion with customer route filtering.
1 Introduction
Internet routing is a critical infrastructure service for distributing reachability information glob-
ally. Partly due to the assumption made by the early Internet designers that there exists little
or no malicious and misconfiguration behavior on the Internet, today’s Internet routing system
is still largely unprotected. Unfortunately, we have witnessed several serious incidents [9, 23]
of disrupted network connectivity for many prefixes including those hosting important services
such as DNS. Despite many proposals such as So-BGP [25], SBGP [19], and SPV [17], there are
still no widely deployed effective prevention and mitigation solutions against routing attacks such
as IP prefix hijacking. Two main problems exist with existing solutions, hindering widespread
adoption. Firstly, many of these solutions require significant modifications to the BGP routing
protocol, making adoption challenging. Secondly, the benefit of partial adoption appears limited,
leading to reluctant initial adoption [12].
The critical importance of protecting the Internet from IP prefix hijacking attacks, which can
severely disrupt network reachability, motivates the need for devising incrementally deployable
network-based defense solutions. Existing work has so far focused mainly on 1) detection alone,
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relying on manual response from network operators, without considering automated responses,
and 2) proactive prevention.
In this paper, we build on previous work on automatic prefix hijacking detection to propose
automatic reactive mitigation mechanism in response to detected attacks. Our solution is based
on the idea of bogus route purging and valid route promotion. Participating ASes, typically in the
core of Internet, delete the bogus routes. Some ASes promote valid routes by shortening their AS
paths using the AS SET construct, while preserving the forwarding path integrity. Based on real-
istic simulations, we show that with only 20 participating ASes, the percentage of polluted ASes
is reduced from 50% to only 15%. Compared to previous work, our scheme can even effectively
combat colluding attackers from different network locations. Moreover, we prove that the addi-
tion of route promotion does not change the convergence guarantees of the current Internet. We
finally study the benefit of incremental deployment in terms of the best placement of mitigation
solutions.
In addition to reactive mitigation, we analyze how detection systems relying on multiple BGP
feeds are subject to evasion, and demonstrate this limitation using realistic settings. Motivated by
the need for proactive prevention to eliminate IP hijacking in many cases to complement reactive
mitigation response, we study customer route filtering, a best common practice, and show its
limitation. We also show that this proactive scheme can be combined with our reactive scheme
to provide higher benefit than each of them alone.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on prefix hijacking
and a taxonomy of hijacking defense solutions. Section 3 presents the methodology of our study.
Section 4 presents a novel reactive mitigation scheme. Section 5 shows the limitation of the
reactive approach due to detection evasion and analyzes a proactive scheme. Finally we conclude
with related work and several remarks.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly review IP prefix hijacking targeted at the interdomain routing protocol
– BGP. IP prefix hijacking occurs when a misconfigured or malicious BGP router in a network N
either originates or announces a bogus route that traverses N for an IP prefix p owned by another
network V . Due to the lack of widely deployed security mechanisms to ensure the correctness of
BGP routing updates, the bogus route may be adopted and propagated by some other networks,
causing their forwarding tables being polluted. As a result, some of the traffic destined to the
victim prefix p is misrouted to the attacker BGP router in N , which can perform any malicious
2
Table 1. Taxonomy of prefix hijacking defense techniques.
Defense Network-based End-host-based
Detection
MOAS [34], geo [20], PHAS [22], finger-




Manual response to install filters,





Crypto.-based S-BGP [19], So-BGP [25], SPV [17],
listen-whisper [29]
-
Non-crypto.-based PG-BGP [18], intentional deaggregation,
bogon filter, Hi-BGP [27], customer route
filtering
-
activities pretending to be the victim prefix p or may even choose to selectively forward the traffic
back to the victim [8]. During a hijacking, the bogus route is of the form [. . . N ], whereas the
original correct route is of the form [. . . V ]. Each network M either receives the bogus route or
may not at all observe the bogus route. In the former case, M may choose the bogus route in
case the route is more preferred and thus becomes polluted. In the latter case, M ’s neighboring
networks must not be polluted, thus preventing M from observing the bogus route.
IP prefix hijacking can be performed in several ways. We describe the two main types to
facilitate our subsequent discussion of defense solutions. A more detailed classification can be
found in a recent study [16].
1. Regular prefix hijack occurs when the attack router originates a route to an existing IP
prefix of the victim network. As a result, the Internet is partially polluted, depending on
how preferable the bogus route is compared to the valid route from the perspective of various
networks.
2. Subprefix hijack results from stealing a subnet of an existing prefix in the routing tables by
announcing a route for the subnet originating from the attacker network. Due to longest-
prefix-matching based forwarding, most networks are polluted.
To increase detection difficulties, stealthy attackers may disguise both attack types with falsified
AS paths without modifying the origin AS, while making traffic traverse through the attacker
network. Thus, the bogus route will be of the form [. . . N . . . V ].
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2.1 Taxonomy of Prefix Hijacking Defense
Table 1 presents a taxonomy of the various solutions on defending against BGP prefix hijacking
attacks, including detection schemes, and the main existing techniques, as well as two techniques
studied in this paper for mitigation and prevention.
There are two main approaches to defending against various security attacks on routing pro-
tocols: proactive prevention and reactive mitigation. Ideally, prevention is preferred as it aims
to eliminate attacks. However, due to a lack of global adoption of necessary changes required for
prevention and the possibility of network misconfiguration, proactive prevention alone is never
sufficient. After all, Internet consists of heterogeneous networks, it is quite challenging, if not im-
possible, to enforce uniformly correct configurations and adoption of any newly proposed changes
non-essential to network operations.
It is important to note that reactive mitigation must depend on accurate and timely detection
systems to be effective. Besides potential inaccuracies, we demonstrate in Section 5.1 that detec-
tion systems relying on multiple BGP feeds from different vantage points are inherently susceptible
to detection evasion. Given such limitations, similar to proactive prevention, reactive mitigation
is also imperfect. Therefore in this paper we also analyze the effectiveness of a known proactive
scheme and the added benefits of combining proactive and reactive approaches. Moreover, we
study how deployment locations affect overall effectiveness.
Table 1 further classifies the reactive mitigation into network-based and end-host based schemes.
There are clear trade-offs to each category. Network-based detection and response require coop-
eration from network elements inside the core of the Internet and may suffer from increased route
convergence delays. In contrast, an end-host based approach can be more readily deployed by
end-users or at the edge of the network, but has more limited scope of effectiveness. It usually
relies on application-layer techniques such as overlay routing to bypass polluted networks.
In this work, we focus on incrementally deployable, network-based reactive mitigation and
proactive prevention solutions mainly due to their better efficiency and potential for larger scope
of impact. Many existing work such as SBGP [19] and SoBGP [25] relying on strong cryptography
and PKI faces serious adoption difficulties. Several recent work [30, 10, 33] in this area attempt
to reduce the computational overhead associated with these solutions, another obstacle to wide
adoption. Compared to existing network-based, incrementally deployable mitigation schemes such
as PG-BGP [18] and ACR [31], our mitigation scheme is complementary and identifies a more




In this paper, we study the proposed defense schemes using simulations on inferred AS topolo-
gies1. Before presenting the defense schemes, we first discuss our methodology.
We obtained an AS topology annotated with AS relationships by running Gao’s algorithm [14]
on BGP routing table dumps collected from around 70 vantage point ASes via RouteViews [2].
The topology contains 23,289 ASes, 55,352 inter-AS edges including 44,315 provider-customer
(p2c) edges, 543 sibling-sibling (s2s) edges, and 10,494 peer-peer (p2p) edges. We also used a
recent topology from CAIDA [13], and found that simulations on those two topologies produce
similar results. For the rest of this paper, we present the results only on our inferred topology.
Our simulator emulates BGP route update propagation and the BGP decision process. The
routing policies are configured at each AS based on AS relationships. Route selection policy is
that firstly route selection is profit-driven, i.e., customer’s route is preferred over peer’s route,
and peer’s route is preferred over provider’s route; secondly a shorter route is preferred when
there is a tie policy-wise; finally the AS number is used to break the tie length-wise. Route
export complies with AS relationships. The same routing policy model has been used in previous
studies [23, 18, 31].
We note that although a recent work [24] has proposed an AS topology model shown to predict
AS paths with considerable accuracy, the model is not suitable for simulating prefix hijacks. The
policies in this model are trained in the scenario where the victim originates the prefix, but
not the scenario where attacker originates the prefix. In other words, the policies dictating the
propagation of the attacker’s bogus routes are not captured by the trained policies. As a result,
the model can not well predict the propagation of attacker’s bogus routes.
4 Reactive defenses
As discussed earlier, prefix hijack detection is only the first step towards fully automated defense.
Detection-based response today relies on human intervention, which is slow and error-prone.
In this section, we propose a reactive, detection-assisted mitigation scheme that automatically
responds to detected prefix hijacks and hence mitigates the adverse impact of the attacks in a
timely fashion.
We make the following assumptions on the prefix hijack detection system used to assist auto-
mated hijack mitigation. The fingerprinting-based detection system [16] and the RIPE MyASN
service [3] meet all these requirements.

























































Figure 1. Example of purging-promotion. Gray nodes are polluted ASes. The boxes show
the routing state of the ASes: including the routes learned, and the routes adopted (in bold),
and the routes announced to neighbors.
1. Real-time detection. The detection lag limits the benefit of mitigation.
2. Low false-positives. Mis-identified hijacks can degrade routing of relevant prefixes.
3. Victim and bogus route identification. This guides the our mitigation system to take effective
mitigation response.
4.1 Mitigation System Overview
Our proposed mitigation system extends a prefix hijacking detection system with a set of
counter-measure actions upon detecting a prefix hijack. It does so by contacting a set of preselected
lifesaver ASes and instructs them to take one or two possible actions to revert the polluted routing
tables in these ASes and in other ASes. The mitigation system is trusted by the lifesaver ASes,
and receives a live BGP feed from each lifesaver AS to guide its decision. The trust between
mitigation system and lifesaver ASes will be further discussed in Section 4.6.
Ideally, all ASes in the Internet participate and act as lifesaver ASes to completely eliminate
the bogus routes; however, it is difficult to achieve such global adoption. In practice, the lifesaver
ASes are typically large ISPs traversed by many network paths, which have more incentives for
deploying security features. The mitigation actions executed by the lifesaver ASes remain effective
until the original bogus route is withdrawn, at which point the mitigation system instructs the
lifesaver ASes to revert to the previous state before the attack.
The mitigation system operates as follows. Upon detecting a prefix hijack, the detection system
notifies the mitigation system about the hijack with three pieces of information: the attacker AS,
the victim AS, and the victim prefix. Such information allows any AS (any routers) to differentiate
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between bogus routes which end with the attacker AS and valid routes which end with the victim
AS. The mitigation system then contacts and instructs the lifesaver ASes to perform one or two
possible actions described below:
• Bogus route purging. Each lifesaver AS deletes the bogus routes from its routing table.
Given such ASes are typically large ISPs, the bogus route propagation is throttled. Similar
to conventional manual response, bogus route purging blocks propagation of bogus routes
by deleting it. This is beneficial with even just a few well-connected ASes taking this action.
However, ASes that still receive the bogus route may prefer the route over valid route based
on BGP’s route selection decision process.
• Valid route promotion. A selected subset of lifesaver ASes are chosen by the mitigation
system to further perform route promotion for the valid route to the victim AS: each selected
promoter AS modifies the valid route by moving all ASes in the AS PATH into an AS SET.
The AS SET attribute is a mechanism used for route aggregation [5, 6] and effectively
shortens the AS path to a prefix2. By exploiting AS SET, route promotion makes valid
routes more attractive in the BGP best route selection process, since the AS path length is
effectively shortened. To maximize the promotion effect, the promoter AS announces to all
its neighbors the shortened promotion route, as if the victim prefix is the promoter’s own
prefix.
Figure 1 shows an example of prefix hijack and how purging-promotion helps to mitigate the
attack. Due to space limit, we scale a realistic scenario down to a small-size scenario consisting of
three tier-1 ASes, one of them being the lifesaver, and several tier-2 and tier-3 ASes. In Figure 1(a),
A hijacks V ’s prefix, making Y , Z, M and D polluted by bogus routes. The lifesaver Y then
attempts to revert the routing tables of the polluted ASes using purging and promotion. Y has
learned both a valid route ZMA and a bogus route XNV and thus easily reverts itself by purging
the bogus route XNV (Figure 1(b)). All of Y ’s single-homed customers are reverted as well.
Furthermore, Y can revert its multi-homed customer D by promoting Y ’s route (Figure 1(c)),
i.e., put XNV into AS SET construct to make this new route adopted by D, since the route
appears to be shorter than before.
Path change due to promotion. Route promotion makes more ASes adopt valid routes.
However, these valid routes may not be the same valid routes before the hijack occurred. As a











Figure 2. Prolonged path with multiple promoters. Both AS X and AS Z promote routes to
V .
side effect of promotion, some AS that were not polluted may select valid routes that are actually
longer but allegedly shorter than before the hijack. That is, these ASes experience prolonged paths.
We show in Section 4.4 that this path inflation is not significant. We believe that eliminating
bogus routes is of primary concern in mitigation prefix hijacking, because after all bogus routes
cause unreachability while prolonged paths do not.
How many promoters? In selecting how many lifesavers to perform route promotion, there
is an intricate tradeoff between reduced route pollution and the quality of reverted valid route.
On one hand, using more promoters leads to reverting more polluted ASes to use promoted valid
routes. On other hand, using multiple promoters can lead to prolonged valid route back to the
victim, as shown in Figure 2. Assume before a hijack, AS Y uses a shorter path going back to an
offspring customer V (victim AS) via Y 1 than via Z. When both X and Z are performing route
promotion for V , AS Y switches to advertising an allegedly shorter route Y Z . . . V , which actually
is longer than the original route back to V via Y 1. Then AS X also switches to advertising an
even longer but allegedly shorter route XY ZZ1 . . . V .
Promoter selection. To qualify as a promoter AS, an AS needs to be pollution-free, either
by itself, or by purging in case that it has at least one neighbor AS that is not polluted. This is
because otherwise the promoter AS cannot forward data packets back to the victim, and hence has
no valid route to promote. The promoter is selected by the mitigation system using the strategies
discussed in Section 4.3 soon after the detection of attack and all lifesavers have performed purging.
However, if the hijack is detected by the detection system before the bogus route has converged in
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the global network, it is possible that after the promoter has been selected, the pollution further
spreads out and pollutes all neighbors of the promoter, violating this qualification condition.
In this case, the mitigation system will re-select another qualified promoter to replace. In our
evaluation study in Section 4.4, we found that bogus route purging with lifesavers chosen using
strategies discussed in Section 4.3 ensures most lifesavers to be pollution-free, making promoter
re-selection unlikely to occur.
Protocol implication. We note that route promotion does not violate the BGP protocol, as it
is a special route aggregation on the original route. Route promotion is the opposite of AS path
prepending, a widely-used technique for making routes less preferred by prepending one’s AS to
the AS path more than once. Both approaches attempt to influence route selection of other ASes
by adjusting the AS path length without violating forwarding integrity of ensuring packets still
reaching the correct destination.
Although promotion complies with BGP protocol, promoting a route causes temporary devia-
tion from the AS relationship between the promoter and its neighbors. This means that promotion
creates a new AS relationship other than the traditional customer-provider and peer-peer rela-
tionships. Therefore, we study the implication of promotion on route convergence guarantee and
delay in Section 4.2.
Note that while our automated purging-promotion scheme provides timely mitigation against
prefix hijacking, using a handful lifesavers does not always eliminate the bogus route across the
entire Internet. In principle, the propagation of bogus routes can be blocked more effectively by
choosing the handful lifesavers to be close to the attack router. However, this assumes that we
have a large number of lifesaver candidates. Therefore, our proposed automated scheme is not a
substitute for the the traditional manual response whose goal is to remove the offender. Instead,
our scheme complements the traditional manual response by quickly removing the impact of prefix
hijacking from a large majority of the networks.
4.2 Correctness and Performance Analysis
We show the proposed route promotion scheme will preserve the convergence properties of the
current BGP.
Claim 1. For a BGP system that has only customer-provider and peer-to-peer relationships, and
multiple route promoters, if all ASes follow Gao’s guildeline, then the system is safe.
Our proof is an extension of the proof in [15], also based on the same two lemmas as Lemma 5.1
and Lemma 5.2 in [15]. The first lemma claims that BGP system described above has a stable
9
state. The second lemma claims that the BGP system coverges to the stables state for any initial
state and any fair activation sequence.
Similar to [15], we construct activation sequences that lead to stable states. To describe the
sequence, we use the S(v) to represent a linear ordering of ASes that starts with AS v and conforms
to the partial order in customer-to-provider DAG, concatenated by another linear ordering of ASes
that conforms to the partial order in provider-to-customer DAG. S(v) is a combination of Phase 1
and Phase 2 in [15]. The Phase 1 and Phase 2 in S(v) are denoted by S(v).Phase1 and S(v).Phase2
respectively.
The route promotion resembles the case that multiple ASes (promoters and victim) originate
the same prefix. As the basis of further discussion, we prove the existence of stable state in a
simpler BGP system with multiple origin ASes.
Lemma 1. For a BGP system that has only customer-provider and peer-to-peer relationships,
and a destination prefix is announced from m origin ASes v1,v2,. . . ,vm, if all ASes follow Gao’s
guildeline, then the activation sequence S(v1)S(v2) . . . S(vm) brings the system to a stable state.
Proof. To be concise, we assume m = 2. The proof can be trivially rewritten to handle m > 2. An
AS reaches a stable state after its activation in S(v2).Phase1. We prove this claim by induction
on the order that ASes are activated in S(v2).Phase1. Suppose all ASes preceding an AS u
in S(v2).Phase1 reach a stable state after their activation. u selects its best route among its
customer routes, either originated by v1 or v2. A customer could (1) has been activated earlier
in S(v2).Phase1; or (2) is not activated in S(v2).Phase1 but has been activated in S(v1).Phase2;
or (3) is not activated in S(v2).Phase1 but has been activated in S(v1).Phase1. For case (1), the
customer reaches a stable state because of induction hypothesis. For case (2), the customer never
exports route to u, and therefore the customer’s decision does not affect u. For case (3), the
customer has already reached a stable state when it was activated in S(v1).Phase1. Putting all
three cases together, u reaches a stable state after its activation in S(v2).Phase1. The claim is
thus proved. Similarly, an AS reaches a stable state after its activation in S(v2).Phase2.
Next we introduce promoters into the BGP system. In addition to normal activations, we
introduce meta activations that set the modes of promoters. A promoter has two modes, locked
and unlocked. In locked mode, a promoter acts as a normal AS, and in unlocked mode, a promoter
performs promotion. Intially all promoter are in locked mode. A promotoer i remain locked until
the meta activation unlock(i) sets the mode of promoter i to unlocked.
Motivated by Lemma 1, the intuitive way to construct the activation sequence that leads the
BGP system to a stable state consists of three steps: (1) lock all promoters, (2) apply the activation
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sequence S(v), where v origins the destination prefix, (3) repeatedly for each promoter pi one
by one, unlock pi and apply the activation sequence S(pi). For example, for two promoters,
the activation sequence is S(v), unlock(p1), S(p1), unlock(p2), S(p2). However, there is a slight
difference between route promotion and multiple origin. After S(p2), p1’s decision might be
changed by p2’s promotion route. In this case, p1 must select a route promoted by p2, and p1
needs to reannounce the new promotion route, which involves another S(p1). Hence the proper
sequence would be S(v), unlock(p1), S(p1), unlock(p2), S(p2), S(p1). Note that p2 will not change
its decision after the last S(p1), because the promotion route has p1 in the AS SET construct.
Lemma 2. The BGP system described in Claim 1 has a stable state.
Proof. Given in the BGP system a victim AS v and n promoters p1, p2, . . . , pn, our constructed
activation sequence σ∗ consists of the following (n + 1) steps:
Step 0: S(v)
Step 1: unlock p1, S(p1)
Step 2: unlock p2, S(p2), S(p1)
. . . . . .
Step i: unlock pi, S(pi), S(pi−1), . . . , S(p1)
. . . . . .
Step n: unlock pn, S(pn), S(pn−1), . . . , S(p1)
In the following, we prove the lemma by induction. The induction hypothesis is that after Step i,
promoters p1, p2, . . . , pi are in unlocked mode, and the system reaches a stable state under the cur-
rent mode. The hypothesis trivially hold when i = 0. Suppose the hypothesis holds for Step i−1.
After Step i, pi becomes unlocked. pi’s promotion may change the route selection of p1, p2, . . . , pi−1.
Since they have reached their stable states before pi’s promotion, the change, if any, must be switch
to routes promoted by pi. According to Lemma 1, replaying S(pi), S(pi−1), . . . , S(p1) leads the
system to a stable state under current mode. Note that pi will not change its decision after any
S(pk), where k = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1. The reason is that if the promotion route by pk is new, the route
must has pi in the AS SET construct and hence does not affect pi.
As a consequence of induction hypothesis, after Step n, all promoters are fully functioning
because they are in all unlocked mode, and the system reaches a stable state. This proves the
lemma.
Lemma 3. The BGP system converges to the stable state for any initial state and any fair
activation sequence.
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Proof. This lemma can be proved by extending the proof in [15].
Claim 2. Let MinRouteAdver period be ∆. The convergence time of a route promotion of a IP
prefix by one or more ASes is at most ∆ ·D, where D is the longest simple path of ASes which is
bounded by the number of ASes in the network. The number of route update messages generated
during convergence is bounded by (D · E), where E is the number of BGP session between the
routers.
The convergence time for the single-promoter case is the same as in the unmodified BGP. The
main reasoning for the convergence time with multiple promoters staying the same is based on
the following observation, which is the same as Observation 2 in [21].
Observation 1. The primary effect of a MinRouteAdver timer is to impose a monotonically
increasing path metric for successive k-level iterations (convergence rounds).
Proof. We separate two cases. In case 1, after convergence, no promoter ends up in the AS Set
of other promoters’ advertised route (for the victim prefix.) In other words, the AS Set used to
reach the victim AS when each promoter started advertising the promoted route is not affected by
other promoters during convergence. This case is no different from the legitimate multiple-origin
ASes for a prefix scenario in unmodified BGP. Hence the convergence time of this case stays the
same as later.
In case 2, after convergence, some promoters ends up in the AS Set of some other promoters’
advertised route (for example, Figure 2). We define a partial ordering of the promoters based on
this relationship: if promoter pi appears in the AS Set of promoter pj, then pi < pj. One can then
construct a forest of all the promoters using topological sort based on the partial ordering.
With this relationship, the overall convergence of multiple promoters advertising routes using
AS Set can be reasoned as follows. We assume there is only one tree in the forest as multiple trees
do not interference with each other (a simple generalization of case 1). First, the promoted route
of the tree root is propagated, savaging all the ASes reached that preferred the new route. When
the announcement reaches its child promoter(s) in the tree, the AS Set of the child promoter is
updated, and the child promoter advertises the new shorter route for the victim prefix (because
the path to the parent promoter is shorter than that to the victim AS.) This new advertisement
should not affect any ancestor promoters or any ASes that have already switched to their final
routes (routes to the victim prefix after global convergence.) The propagation process continues
and eventually reaches the leaf promoters in the tree. Again, they update their routes for the
victim prefix and advertise the updated routes. From now on, no promoters’ route will ever be
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affected, and hence the scenario is no different from the legitimate multiple-origin ASes scenario.
Hence the total convergence time is at most ∆ ·D, where D is the longest simple path of ASes.
We note that the promoter ASes typically reside in the core of the Internet with only a few AS
hops away from most other ASes. Thus the convergence delay for the promotion route, which is
also the latency for the mitigation action to take effect, is expected to be quite low. An empirical
study [26] shows that convergence delay of routes originated from the core is typically observed
from most ASes as less than one minute. We expect that the mitigation latency of our scheme is
typically within one minute.
4.3 Lifesaver and Promoter Selection Strategies
Since the route purging is performed on all lifesavers while route promotion is performed on one
or a few lifesavers, the effectiveness of our mitigation scheme are determined by both the strategy
of selecting lifesaver ASes among the ASes in the Internet when deploying the mitigation system
and the strategy of selecting the promoter AS among these lifesaver ASes when a prefix hijack is
detected.
The selection of lifesaver ASes affects the effectiveness of bogus route purging. The selection
is challenging because they are selected prior to attacks whose locations are not yet known.
Intuitively, choosing the lifesavers among the most well-connected ASes would best throttle the
propagation of bogus routes and hence maximize the benefit.
The selection of promoter directly affects the effectiveness of valid route promotion. In valid
route promotion, the promoter effectively “takes over” the victim prefix from the victim AS and
announces the prefix as the promoter’s own. This behavior is analogous to the case where the
promoter’s own prefix is hijacked by the attacker. So the benefit of valid route promotion is closely
related to the promoter’s resilience against the attacker, i.e., how well the promoter can protect
its own prefix against the hijack. Therefore choosing the most resilient AS against the attacker
maximizes the effectiveness of valid route promotion. Intuitively, well-connected tier-1 ASes have
shorter paths to the other ASes, and hence are generally more resilient. However, a recent work [23]
has shown using simulations that the most resilient ASes are tier-2 ASes with large numbers of
providers mainly due to profit-driven routing policies on the Internet. Furthermore, because the
selection of lifesavers dictates where the promoter comes from, resilience is also considered in the
lifesaver selection strategy.
We propose several practical selection strategies as listed in Table 2 and Table 3. Lifesaver
selection occurs during deployment, and is therefore based on static AS topological properties.
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Table 2. Lifesaver selection strategies.
Name Description
degree Select the largest-degree ASes as lifesaver ASes.
resilience Select tier-2 ASes with the largest number of providers as lifesaver ASes.
hybrid Select half of lifesaver ASes using strategy degree, and select the other
half using strategy resilience.
Table 3. Promoter selection strategies.
Name Description
random Randomly select a lifesaver as long as it has not been polluted.
far Select the lifesaver that has not been polluted and is farthest from the
victim in terms of AS path length.
near Select the lifesaver that has not been polluted and is nearest to the at-
tacker in terms of AS path length.
tier2-rand Randomly select a promoter among the unpolluted tier-2 lifesavers if there
is any. Otherwise, randomly select among all unpolluted lifesavers.
optimal Select the lifesaver whose promotion action achieves the largest pollution
reduction.
all Select all lifesavers as promoters. This is used to defend against colluding
attacks.
One strategy is to use the node degree which indicates an AS’s connectivity. Another is based
on the number of providers of a tier-2 AS which reflects that AS’s resilience. Promoter selection
happens after attack detection, and hence uses information on the victim and the attacker. For
example, the near strategy aims at preventing the neighborhood of the attacker from pollution
and thus limiting the scope of the attack. The far strategy aims at maximizing the route length
reduction from the original route to the promotion route. Finally, we include “optimal” which
represents the best possible promoter selection strategy based on simulations. For this strategy
study, we focus on selecting single promoter to gain some insight on its impact on the mitigation
benefit, but we also include a simple strategy all that use all lifesavers as promoters.
In the following, we use the notation “xxx|yyy” to denote the combined strategy, where xxx is
the lifesaver selection strategy and yyy is the promoter selection strategy.
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4.4 Evaluation
We evaluate our proposed scheme using simulations on the inferred AS topology (Section 3).
N ASes on the AS topology are chosen as lifesavers using different strategies. We vary N from 0
to 24. For each N , 200 random regular prefix hijack trials are simulated. For each trial, a single
attacker AS and a single victim AS are randomly selected among all Internet ASes. Stealthy
hijacks using falsified AS paths are not considered, because they complicate hijack detection but
not mitigation. Handling subprefix hijacks is discussed later in Section 4.6.
4.4.1 The Benefit of Bogus Route Purging
We first study the benefit of bogus route purging alone. Figure 3(1) shows the benefit of bogus
route purging with various numbers of lifesavers chosen by the three strategies in Table 2. The
figure shows that purging bogus routes at a few ASes provides some protection against prefix
hijack. This is because of the route diversity at these lifesavers. The well-connected lifesaver has
many neighbors that provide diverse routes to a destination prefix. It is unlikely that all these
neighbors are polluted, and hence the lifesaver is highly likely to find a valid route. Also note
that the degree strategy performs better than the other two strategies which tend to choose ASes
with smaller degree. Therefore, maximizing the degree of lifesavers achieves the best bogus route
purging benefit.
4.4.2 The Benefit of Route Purging-Promotion
Next we study the benefit of combining bogus route purging and valid route promotion. We
assume the degree strategy as lifesaver selection strategy. We assume a single route promoter,
and study the first four promoter selection strategies in Table 3, excluding the all strategy to
isolate the effects of multiple promoters from the impact of selection strategies. Figure 3(2) shows
the benefit of route purging-promotion using these strategies as well as using purging alone.
We make the following observations. First, route purging-promotion achieves higher benefit than
bogus route purging alone. In Figure 3(2), with 8 lifesaver ASes, the fraction of Internet ASes that
are polluted by a hijack is reduced from 50% to 20% using promoter selection strategy random,
whereas this fraction is 30% for purging alone (Figure 3(1)). Second, in Figure 3(2), there is a
gap between those three strategies and optimal. The gap is because path length is not the only
deciding factor in BGP decision process. Local preference dictated by AS relationship overrides
path length. Length-based strategies Far and near as well as random do not effectively capture
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Figure 3. Pollution of a random prefix hijack when a number of lifesavers perform (1) bogus
route purging, (2) purging-promotion using degree-based strategies, (3) purging-promotion
using resilience-aware strategies.
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are mostly tier-2 ASes. This observation motivates using the resilience-aware strategies listed in
Table 2 and Table 3.
4.4.3 Enhancement by Resilience-based Strategies
Next we evaluate the effectiveness of several combined lifesaver and promoter selection strategies,
again assuming a single promoter. Our evaluation includes four combined strategies: degree|random,
and three resilience-aware strategies, namely degree|tier2-random, resilience|random, hybrid|tier2-
random. The results are shown in Figure 3(3). We make the following observations. First,
resilience|random performs worst. Although choosing lifesavers based on resilience maximizes
the benefit of valid route promotion, this benefit is offset by the inferior benefit of bogus route
purging by these lifesavers. It has been shown in Figure 3(1) that maximizing the degree of the
lifesaver ASes achieves the most effective bogus route purging. Second, degree|tier2 − random
and hybrid|tier2 − random perform best. They both trade off between maximizing connectivity
for purging and maximizing resilience for promotion.
4.4.4 Prolonged Routing Paths due to Promotion
A negative effect of route promotion is potentially suboptimal route selection. The route promoter
can oversell its route, i.e., when the actual length of the promotion route is longer than the length
calculated in BGP decision process. Figure 4(1) shows the AS path inflation experienced by the
pollution-free ASes in route purging-promotion using the degree|random strategy and a single
promoter. The path inflation is defined as the relative AS path length increase experienced by
each AS after the promotion compared to the original AS path length. We observe that the AS
path inflation is mostly small. In most cases more than 50% of the pollution-free ASes experience
no inflation at all, more than 70% of the pollution-free ASes experience less than 20% inflation,
and almost all pollution-free ASes experience less than 50% inflation.
We also analyze the tradeoff between reduced pollution and increased path inflation with more
promoters as discussed in Section 4.1. We make every lifesaver perform both route purging and
promotion, and vary the number of lifesavers. Figure 5(3) and Figure 4(2) show that for a
single attacker, more lifesavers results in fewer polluted ASes, but the path inflation for pollution-
free ASes also increases drastically. Based on this tradeoff, a single promoter appears sufficient
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Figure 4. AS-path inflation experienced by pollution-free ASes under purging-promotion. The
strategy of selecting lifesaver and promoter is (1) degree|random, (2) degree|all.
4.4.5 Colluding Attack and Defense
So far we have assumed that the attacker originates a bogus route from a single AS. With access
to multiple ASes, the attacker can maximize the adoption of bogus routes by originating a bogus
route from each of these ASes. We now study the pollution of colluding attacks and how our
mitigation system defends against these attacks. We vary the number of attacker ASes from 1 to
5.
Figure 5(1) shows the pollution of such colluding attacks when all lifesavers perform purging.
Purging is less effective against colluding attacks than regular attacks. An interesting observa-
tion is that the lifesavers often lose the combat against attacker ASes even when the lifesavers
outnumber the attackers. For example, a 4-AS colluding attack pollutes more than 50% of the
Internet even with 8 lifesavers. This is because the “machinery” used by two sides are different.
Attacker ASes originate routes, while lifesaver ASes delete routes, which is far less effective.
Figure 5(2) shows the pollution when a single lifesaver performs promotion in addition to
purging. This is the strategy shown to be effective to handle a single attacker AS. However, with
multiple attackers, the pollution reduction is small compared to the corresponding purging-alone
cases.
To more effectively promote valid routes in the presenec of multiple attackers, we have all the
lifesavers perform promotion. Each lifesaver does promotion independently, and thus no global
coordination is needed. Figure 5(3) shows the dramatic improvement in the defense effectiveness.
Given that colluding attacks have never been witnessed on the Internet, selecting single promoter










































































Figure 5. Pollution of a random colluding hijack when (1) all lifesavers perform purging, (2)
single lifesaver performs promotion in addition to purging, (3) all lifesavers perform promotion
in addition to purging.
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4.5 Implementation
The mitigation system can be implemented in software, very similar to the setup of the Routing
Control Platform (RCP) [11] which is used to control the route selection decision of routers within
a single ISP. The mitigation system communicates with the RCP-like system in each lifesaver AS
to instruct the AS to perform route purging and promotion. If the lifesaver AS does not deploy
centralized route management using a system like RCP, the mitigation system needs to directly
communicate with one router in each lifesaver AS. That router in turn distributes the updated
routing information to other routers inside the AS relying intradomain routing hierarchy such as
iBGP mesh and route reflector based structure.
4.6 Discussions
In the following, we discuss some issues including trust, detection accuracy, and deployment.
Detection accuracy. The effectiveness of our reactive schemes rely on accurate hijacking
detection, which is a research topic of its own, and expects improvement in the future though
good progress has been made recently. However, our scheme does not require perfect detection
accuracy. False positives just cause the traffic to take a slightly longer path than before. False
negatives are of more concern. We will investigate them in our future work.
Workload on lifesaver ASes. Performing route promotion increases the workload of the life-
savers, but we expect this increase to be negligible. Given that prefix hijacking is a rare event,
the number of prefixes under attack simultaneously is small compared to the large number of pre-
fixes that these large lifesaver ISPs provide transit for. Therefore, the extra workload for helping
hijacked prefixes should be negligible.
Deployment incentive. Route purging-promotion provides strong incentive for deployment,
because a lifesaver provider prevents its customer from being hijacked and being polluted by
hijacks. Morever, the scheme is effective with small scale of deployment.
Trust between mitigation system and lifesaver ASes. We assume that there will be one
well-known detection and mitigation system, which does not misbehave, i.e., it is a public Internet
service like the DNSBL used for blacklisting spamming hosts. Lifesaver ASes and the mitigation
system authenticate each other using SSL certificates when the mitigation system collects valid
BGP feed or sends purging-promotion instructions. There are a limited number of entities whose
identities need to be verified. Each lifesaver needs to verify the identity of the mitigation system,
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but not other lifesavers. The mitigation system needs to verify the identities of the lifesavers.
Hence our scheme does not require a full-blown PKI like what is required in SoBGP [25].
Subprefix hijacking. Route purging-promotion could be extended to handle subprefix hijacks.
Upon the detection of subprefix hijacks, the detection system notifies the victim AS. If the victim
AS could originate the hijacked subprefix promptly, the subprefix hijacks is no different from a
regular prefix hijack.
4.7 Summary
We have presented a reactive mitigation system combining bogus route purging and valid route
promotion. Simulations show:
• Purging bogus routes at a few high-degree ASes (e.g., 20 highest-degree ASes) provides good
protection against prefix hijack (e.g., a reduction of pollution down to 24%). Maximizing
the degree of lifesavers achieves the best bogus route purging benefit.
• Adding promotion to purging reduces the remaining pollution by 33% ∼ 57%.
• Selecting lifesavers and promoters by trading off between maximizing connectivity for purg-
ing and maximizing resilience for promotion achieves the best benefit.
• The resulting routing sub-optimality is insignificant. More than 50% of the pollution-free
ASes use AS paths of the same length, and almost all of them adopt AS paths less than
50% longer compared to before the attack.
5 Proactive defenses
The reactive mitigation scheme proposed in Section 4 relies on an accurate hijack detection
system, as it is triggered after a hijack is detected. However, the detection system may not detect
all attacks due to the limited visibility. In this section, we first study the coverage of the detection
system to motivate the need for proactive prevention schemes. We then analyze the effectiveness
of a known proactive scheme: customer filtering.
5.1 Detection Evasion
We define attack detection evasion as follows.
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Definition 1. (Detection Evasion) We denote the monitoring system as SM = m1, m2, . . . , mn,
where there are altogether n monitors in distinct ASes. Given an attacker A, a victim V , and
the hijacked prefix p, if ∀i, PrefAmi(p) < Pref
V
mi
(p), where PrefAmi(p) is the route preference value
for p announced from A observed by monitor mi, then attacker A can hijack V ’s p without being
detected.
Note that since the detection system receives the best route from each monitor, only when at
least one of the monitors chooses the bad route as its best route, hijacking becomes visible to the
monitor system.
An example of attack evasion from the monitoring system is depicted in Figure 6. Attacker
A hijacks one of victim V ’s prefix p. Node M is the monitoring system. We present the system
as a single node for ease of explanation. M receives both routes for prefix p originated from A
and V with different path length. Obviously, due to route selection based on the commonly used
profit-driven policy, i.e., preferring customer over peer and over provider, M selects the route
from V due to preference for customer routes.
We summarize the conditions for attack evasion.
Observation 2. An attacker can evade detection if any of the following is true for all monitoring
nodes.
• The victim route is a customer or peer route, and the attacker route is a provider route.
• The victim route is a customer route, the attacker route is a provider or peering route.
• Both the victim and attacker routes have the same profit-driven preference, but the victim
route is shorter.
We further perform simulations to demonstrate the real evasion threat under the RouteViews
monitoring system, commonly used by many studies. For scalability, we ignore stub AS nodes
which do not provide transit in the simulations. Our results can be easily extended to consider
stub nodes which have to traverse through one of their providers to reach other networks. We
identified 27,145 attacker/victim pairs evading detection, accounting for 0.2% of all possible AS
pairs ignoring stub nodes. Among them there are 2194 distinct attackers and 1691 distinct victims.
Figure 7 further shows how many possible victims a given attacker can choose to hijack, and
similarly how many possible attackers can affect each victim. Among these potential attackers,
72% are edge ASes (tier-4, tier-5). Similarly, 73% of the victims are edge ASes.
Although an attacker can evade detection by carefully selecting victims, this limits attack
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Figure 8. The polluted ASes under detection evasion.
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desire to evade detection. Figure 8 shows the fraction of polluted ASes from all evasion scenarios
studied. We observe that 40% attacker ASes can only pollute 10% of all the ASes if evading
detection.
5.2 Customer Route Filtering
Section 5.1 shows that a hijack detection system relying on BGP feeds due to limited visibility
cannot detect all possible prefix hijacks as needed by reactive schemes such as route purging-
promotion. In this section, we study customer route filtering, a known proactive scheme that does
not rely on real-time IP prefix hijack detection.
5.2.1 Design
Customer route filtering is currently practiced by several large ISPs to prevent their customers
from injecting bogus routes. Such an ISP AS P maintains a route registry among P and its direct
customers Pi. Each Pi registers the prefixes that Pi announces to P . These prefixes are prefixes
originated by ASes in Pi’s customer-cone, i.e., by Pi, Pi’s customers, Pi’s customers’ customers,
and so on. Route filtering is performed at the each BGP session between P and its direct customer
Pi. Any route announced by Pi for a prefix not registered is blocked by the filter at P .
While route filtering is potentially effective, ISPs performing route filtering rely on up-to-date
route registries. In practice, ISPs can maintain route registries separately, e.g., as used by Level
3, or share one route registry, e.g., as used in RIPE [1]. In either case, the freshness of route
registries is critical to route filtering. Although the local registry is relatively easier to maintain
than a global registry as the participants are involved in direct business relation, it still requires
coordinated efforts to synchronize the registries owned by different providers. Reassignment or
new assignment of a prefix requires updates to the multiple registries of all the providers of the
prefix owner that are higher up in the AS hierarchy.
5.2.2 Evaluation
Although customer route filtering has been practiced by some large ISPs, its effectiveness in
defending against prefix hijacks has not been studied before, especially for partial deployment.
Furthermore, it is unlikely to be voluntarily deployed globally, as it requires additional manage-
ment overhead of keeping track of addresses allocated to customers whose multihoming practice
further complicates it. In the following, we evaluate the effectiveness of partially deployed cus-
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25
choose attacker and victim ASes, and simulate regular prefix hijacks. We consider the same degree
heuristic used for route purging: the ASes with the largest degree are selected first. Selecting the
ASes based on their resilience is not considered as the selected ASes do not originate new routes.
The solid triangle curve in Figure 9 shows the pollution by random prefix hijacks under customer
route filtering. We see that customer route filtering provides limited protection against prefix
hijacks. With 16 most well-connected ASes performing filtering, the fraction of polluted Internet
is 32%, and with 80 performing filtering, the fraction is reduced to 9%. However, these numbers
are much worse compared to route purging, with the same numbers of participating ASes due to
these two reasons.
1. Customer route filtering is performed on limited links, whereas route purging are performed
at the AS level. In the former case, an AS does not perform filtering on links to its peers or
providers, it may import a bogus route. In contrast, an AS that implements route purging
never imports bogus routes.
2. Even links that perform filtering cannot distinguish certain bogus routes: if both the attacker
and victim are within the same customer-cone of the customer end of a link that implements
the filtering, the filter is not effective. Such a link is considered to be defense-incapable for
these attacks.
Figure 10 quantifies how often the above case (2) occurs. We define defense-responsible c2p
link in a prefix hijack as a c2p link that satisfies the following two conditions: (1) the provider
end of this link performs filtering; (2) this link is traversed by a normal route originated by the
attacker. In other words, defense-responsible c2p links are those links responsible for defending
against the bogus routes. We see that although the number of defense-responsible c2p links are
seemingly large, 80% are defense-incapable.
The vast majority of defense-incapable c2p links is explained by Figure 11 which shows the
customer-cone sizes of all ASes. Probably due to the wide use of multi-homing, 356 ASes (denoted
by set W ) have a customer-cone size larger than 17000 and the remaining ASes (denoted by set
W C) generally have much smaller customer-cone size (less than 100). Consider the filter between
a provider P and one of its direct customers Pi. If Pi is in W , it is likely that both the attacker
and the victim are within the customer-cone of Pi, making the filter defense-incapable. If Pi is
in W C , it is likely that the attacker is not within the customer-cone of Pi, making the filter not
defense-responsible.
However, the high percentage of defense-incapable c2p links is not a completely negative obser-
vation. Figure 10 shows that the number of defense-capable c2p links consistently increases with
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the number of ASes deployed with filters, which contributes to the decrease of hijack pollution in
Figure 9.
Route purging-promotion and customer route filtering complement each other. The solid square-
and-circle curves in Figure 9 show the effectiveness of using customer route filtering together with
route purging-promotion deployed on four highest-degree ASes and together with route purging-
promotion deployed on eight highest-degree ASes, respectively. They both show an additional
reduction of pollution to the case of using customer route filtering alone.
5.2.3 Summary
We have evaluated customer route filtering, a proactive scheme currently practiced by some large
ISPs. Our simulations show that the effectiveness of customer filtering against prefix hijacking is
much lower than route purging with the same scale of deployment. This observation is because
a significant proportion of the filters are unable to confine the bogus routes originated from the
customer-cone, which is caused by the rich connectivity of the Internet topology.
6 Related Work
Existing work in the area of proactively defending against routing attacks mainly focuses on us-
ing strong cryptography or incremental solutions such as intentional deaggregation to proactively
prevent against routing attacks as shown in Table 1. We note that besides deployment difficulties
partly due to computational overhead and PKI requirement, solutions such as SBGP [19] and
SoBGP [25] do not completely eliminate routing attacks such as IP prefix hijacking, as they au-
thenticate the routing information and the origin of the route, but do not ensure the correctness
of the entire AS path.
Our study focuses on incrementally deployable network-based solutions. Several existing so-
lutions fall in this category, but all with serious limitations. For example, intentional route
deaggregation refers to the practice of ISPs advertise many small prefixes within its address block
for fear of subprefix hijacks. Such practice increases the already large routing table sizes and also
do not guarantee valid routes will be preferred over bogus routes. A recent proposal of pretty good
BGP [18] merely delays the selection of suspicious routes and as a side-effect increases the time
to adopt legitimate new routes. Note that our study has so far focused on hijacking of allocated
and advertised IP prefixes, as they cause more damage compared to hijacking of unallocated or
bogon routes. Bogon filters [4] is an effective approach to avoid propagating such invalid routes.
However, similar to ingress and customer route filtering, such filters are not globally deployed.
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Our work proposes automated reactive mitigation response through route purging and promo-
tion, which is complementary to the current manual response to detected routing hijacks. Finally,
our reactive mitigation system relies on an accurate and timely detection system, achieved from
several existing systems [16, 20, 22, 35]. Our work is also motivated by a recent study [23] ana-
lyzing the resilience of Internet topology against prefix hijacks.
7 Conclusions
In this study, we address the defense against an important attack targeted at the current
Internet routing system, namely the IP prefix hijacking attack against BGP, by developing novel
incrementally deployable network-based reactive mitigation solution. Using our proposed solution,
simulation results based on realistic network topologies demonstrate that with intelligent selection
of deployment locations, the number of polluted ASes can be reduced down to around 15% with
a relatively small number of participating ASes (e.g., 20). In contrast, the current network-based
solution such as customer route filtering is much less effective at limiting the impact of polluted
routes. We believe that our work explored the limits of readily deployable network-based defense
against IP hijacking. We are also the first to point out the general limitations of hijack detection
systems due to their reliance on BGP feeds and caused by evasion. These lessons illustrated by
our work provide guidance for designing the secure next-generation Internet routing system.
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